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A LIFE WELL LIVED:
REMEMBRANCES OF JUDGE A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM JR.---HS DAYS, HIS
JURISPRUDENCE, AND HIS LEGACY
Colleen L. Adams, Rubin M Sinins, & Linda Y Yueh*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Judge Higginbotham "retired," he redefined the term,
which usually means the cessation of work. The "Judge," as he was
affectionately known to us, retired after twenty-nine years on the
federal bench' to become professor2 at three schools3 at Harvard
University; senior counsel4 at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
* The authors served as research associates to Judge Higginbotham dur-
ing overlapping periods from 1993 to 1998. Colleen L. Adams holds a J.D.
from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and is a senior attorney
for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this Article do not necessarily rep-
resent the views of the EEOC or the United States. Rubin M. Sinins holds a
J.D. from George Washington University National Law Center and is a partner
in the law firm of Sinins and Bross, P.C., Newark, New Jersey. Linda Y. Yueh
holds a J.D. from New York University School of Law and has delivered a
portion of this Article in a speech at the NYU School of Law Memorial Serv-
ice for Judge Higginbotham on February 23, 1999.
1. The Judge was Chief Judge Emeritus of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit when he retired from the bench on March 5, 1993.
He served 16 years on the appellate court and 13 years on the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. At the time of his ap-
pointment to the district court by President Lyndon B. Johnson, the Judge was
the youngest person to be appointed to the federal bench in the preceding
thirty-odd years. He was thirty-five years old.
2. Judge Higginbotham was the Public Service Professor of Jurisprudence
at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (the Ken-
nedy School).
3. He taught at the Department of Afro-American Studies, Harvard Law
School, and the Kennedy School.
4. The Judge served as counsel to Paul, Weiss, Rifidnd, Wharton & Garri-
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Garrison (Paul, Weiss); and commissioner on the United States
Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR). During his spare time, the
Judge relaxed from his untiring lifelong efforts to eradicate inequal-
ity by receiving the nation's highest civilian honor, the Presidential
Medal of Freedom--retirement indeed. This Article cannot begin to
do justice to the Judge's formidable legacy. We simply intend to
share some of our views on the jurisprudence of Judge Higginbotham
and our many fond memories of having had the privilege and pleas-
ure of working with one of the greatest jurists, teachers, and men of
our time.
II. A WELL-LIVED LIFE
It is virtually impossible to describe the exhilaration that accom-
panied working for the Judge. This enthusiasm remained even
though we would often leave the office at the same late hour that the
janitorial service was taking out the day's garbage.
At Harvard, the Judge ran two fully staffed offices and taught
three courses in the same term for over one hundred students. The
Judge had to limit the enrollment in his courses as his students con-
sistently overfilled the assigned seminar rooms-one year, the course
waiting list exceeded seventy persons. In addition, he kept a third of-
fice at Paul, Weiss in New York and maintained a fourth office in his
home.
There was never a dull moment when we worked as his research
associates. One minute he would be conducting a research meeting
son after leaving the bench in 1993 and was named one of three senior counsel
to the firm in 1998.
5. His wife, Professor Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, also of Harvard Uni-
versity, is completing the Judge's autobiography, which details the many ex-
traordinary events in his life.
6. The Judge was an expert in time management. On his ride from home
to his office at the Kennedy School, the Judge, in the midst of heavy traffic,
would dictate a speech on his cell phone to Carol Derby-his right-hand as-
sistant at Paul, Weiss in New York. By the time the Judge arrived at his of-
fice-about 30 minutes later-a typed copy of the speech would be available
for final editing. No, the Judge did not have a personal chauffeur. One of the
authors would drive the car and listen in amazement as he dictated a speech in
less than 30 minutes that was both eloquent and poignant. For the Judge, time
was a valuable asset never to be wasted sitting in traffic.
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on Shades of Freedom7 in Cambridge, and the next minute we were
on a flight to Washington to prepare the Judge for his testimony be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Committee on affirmative action. We
would simultaneously watch the Judge being questioned on C-SPAN
while assisting in the preparation of his next United States Supreme
Court8 brief on voting rights and editing one of his numerous law re-
view articles going through publication.9 Seemingly concurrently,
the Judge served as counsel to former South African President Nel-
son Mandela's Children's Fund, jointly hosted a conference at Har-
vard on the centennial of the Plessy v. Ferguson10 decision, sat on the
Board of Directors of the New York Times and National Geographic
(among others), represented the Congressional Black Caucus as spe-
cial counsel, attended the monthly USCCR meetings on Fridays, and
testified before the House of Representatives in the impeachment
hearings of President William Jefferson Clinton." The Judge would
prepare for his classes, meet with students, run a research project on
7. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS
AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996) [hereinafter
SHADES].
8. The Judge, as was his nature, ensured that each of us and a number of
students and colleagues were able to attend hearings at the United States Su-
preme Court with him as guests of the Court. When the Judge was a law stu-
dent at Yale during the 1950s, one of his professors, John Frank, arranged for
him to visit the United States Supreme Court to hear a case argued by Thur-
good Marshall. The case was Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and the
issue was whether an African American could be admitted to the University of
Texas Law School. The Judge often described this experience as "exhilarat-
ing." Specifically, the Judge said in an interview, "I can't think of anything
more exhilarating for a young person than to hear Thurgood's measured, elo-
quent, effective argument... For a young person, it just could not have been
more dramatic." Mark Feeny, Off the Bench but Still in the Arena: A Retired
Federal Judge Continues His Pursuit of a "Mighty Cause, " BOSTON GLOBE,
May 21, 1995, at Focus 47. The Judge extended to us the kindness that was
extended to him decades earlier.
9. See SHADES, supra note 7, at 207, for a list of articles published by
Judge Higginbotham as of 1996.
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding segregated railway cars and creating
the pernicious "separate but equal" doctrine).
11. See Hearing Before the House Judiciary Committee on the Conse-
quences ofPerury and Related Offenses (Dec. 1, 1998), available in 1998 WL
831268 (F.D.C.H) [hereinafter Hearing on Perjury] (testimony of Judge A.
Leon Higginbotham Jr.).
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affirmative action staffed by a dozen research assistants, hold book
signings for his critically acclaimed treatise on Race and the Amei-
can Legal Process,12 receive over sixty honorary degrees, appear on
the Today show, give over a hundred speeches annually,' 3 publish
opinion editorials in numerous newspapers, and argue major cases
for Paul, Weiss clients. 14 It seemed to us that this was all just a day's
work in the life of Judge Higginbotham.
I1. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE, RACE, AND EQUALITY
It is not possible in this tribute to effectively describe the
Judge's tremendous impact on American jurisprudence.15 The Judge
wrote about issues which were broad in scope and awesome in
depth.' 6 Because we cannot describe all of his work, we chose three
major areas that commanded the Judge's attention after he retired
from the bench.' 7  These included the congressional voting rights
cases, the jurisprudence of race, and affirmative action.s
12. The treatise is comprised of two books: A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR.,
IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS
(1978) [hereinafter MATTER OF COLOR], and SHADES, supra note 7.
13. His calendar for speeches was so overloaded that universities desiring
the Judge to serve as the commencement speaker had to put in a request at least
two years in advance of the engagement
14. Although two of the authors later worked at Paul, Weiss and the third
author later worked for a federal agency, it was as if we never left our jobs as
his research associates at Harvard whenever the Judge asked for assistance
with a project. The consensus of those who worked with the Judge was that
we were willingly lifetime employees and he would kindly describe us as his
extended family.
15. It is a certainty that there will be substantial focus on the Judge's judi-
cial and scholarly influence in the upcoming years. See, for example, the arti-
cles in this Symposium by Professor F. Michael Higginbotham and others.
16. See generally Ronald K. Noble, A Tribute to a Scholar, a Wise Jurist,
and a Role Model, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 531 (1993) (former law clerk reviews a
portion of the Judge's judicial and scholarly legacy).
17. A fourth area of concern was Justice Clarence Thomas. See, e.g., A.
Leon Higginbothan-, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 1405 (1994); A. Leon Higginbothan, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice
Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1005
(1992); A. Leon Higginbothan, Jr., Thomas Must Stand on His Record, Not on
His Attendance, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 5, 1998, at Editorial 11A.
18. He also continued to work closely on the legal issues involving South
Africa. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbothanm, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in Judicial
[Vol. 33:987
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A. Justice in Voting
In his first year after leaving the bench, the Judge spent a year in
North Carolina' 9 working on a series of cases, beginning with Shaw
v. Reno,20 that changed the jurisprudential landscape of voting rights.
In Shaw, white voters challenged the creation of two minority-
majority districts in North Carolina which had enabled the first
African Americans to be elected to Congress from North Carolina
since Reconstruction.2' White voters challenging these districts
claimed that the segregation of voters into districts by race violated
their constitutional right to participate in a color-blind electoral proc-
ess.
2 2
Judge Higginbotham sought to differ. In response to a flurry
of legal challenges to the creation of minority-majority dist-
ricts in southern states, 23 the Judge worked tirelessly to preserve
Systems: The American Experience and the South African Challenge, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1028 (1993).
19. While in North Carolina, the Judge, along with his wife, Evelyn B.
Higginbotham, was a Fellow with the National Humanities Center. He taught
a course on Contemporary Legal Issues at North Carolina Central University
School of Law. The Judge invited each of the law schools in the local area to
identify students to work with him on contemporary legal issues. One of the
authors of this Article was fortunate to be one of two students selected from
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law to work with
the Judge on a series of research projects, including analyzing significant
United States Supreme Court decisions in the areas of voting rights, civil
rights, and criminal law.
20. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
21. In 1992, North Carolinians elected Eva Clayton and Mel Watt, two Af-
rican Americans, to the House of Representatives of the United States Con-
gress. Prior to 1992, no African Americans had been elected to Congress from
North Carolina since 1901. See id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting).
22. See id. at 641-42.
23. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (affirming a lower court deci-
sion striking down Texas's 18th, 29th, and 30th Congressional Districts);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (affirming the district court's decision
to strike down Georgia's llth Congressional District represented by Rep.
Cynthia McKinney); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (dismissed
for lack of standing on appeal from a lower court's ruling that Louisiana's re-
districting scheme was unconstitutional); Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354
(S.D. Ga. 1994); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Hays
v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993). The challenges originally
arose in the South but later spread to places such as Chicago. See, e.g., Shaw
v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (reversing the lower court's decision and ruling
that North Carolina's 12th Congressional District is unconstitutional); Diaz v.
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minority-majority districts as an efficient mechanism to ensure the
effective and equal voice of African Americans in the electoral proc-
ess. The Judge recognized that creating legislative districts in which
the majority of the population consisted of racial minorities enhanced
the voting strength of racial minorities and more effectively enabled
them to select the candidate of their choice. As a result of the crea-
tion of minority-majority legislative districts, Congress has become
more of a representative democracy with African American con-
gresspersons "at the table" as active participants in determining the
public policy of the nation.
As special counsel to the Congressional Black Caucus, the
Judge assisted in preparing amicus briefs24 in response to these chal-
lenges. The Judge convened several strategic planning sessions
of prominent legal scholars, social scientists, practitioners, and con-
gressional representatives from across the nation to share their pow-
erful insight and expertise on the issues.25 As we listened to the
Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (striking down New York's 12th
Congressional District and providing the legislature until July 30, 1997, to
draw new districts); Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(striking down Virginia's 3d Congressional District); King v. State Bd. of
Elections, 979 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of
Illinois' 4th Congressional District represented by Rep. Luis Gutierrez), va-
cated and remanded for firther consideration in light of Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952 (1996)); Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996)
(striking down Florida's 3d Congressional District represented by Rep. Corrine
Brown); Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (granting
partial summary judgment and holding that the review of the 3d District was
subject to strict scrutiny) (In May 1996, the Florida state legislature redrew the
3rd District to have a 42% black voting age population and Congresswoman
Brown was re-elected in the redrawn district in 1996.); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856
F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (granting summary judgment and rejecting a
constitutional challenge to California's court-drawn legislative and congres-
sional redistricting plans), aff'd in part, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
24. In these briefs, the Judge thoroughly researched and documented the
history of racially polarized voting, the marginalization of the political power
and interests of African Americans in North Carolina, and the necessity of the
creation of majority-minority districts to ensure the effective and equal voice
of African Americans in the political process.
25. Participants in the strategic planning sessions on congressional redis-
tricting included many prominent individuals, such as distinguished historian
Dr. John Hope Franklin, renowned social scientist Dr. David Bositis, and ac-
claimed civil rights scholar Mary Frances Berry, to name a few. For a com-
plete listing of participants see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 633.
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perspectives of these various individuals on the congressional redis-
tricting cases and their impact on minority political empowerment, it
became clear that we were participating in perhaps the most impor-
tant civil rights cases to be decided by the United States Supreme
Court in this decade.
The opportunity to work with the Judge on this project was an
extraordinary experience. We were too young to participate person-
ally in the civil rights struggle of the 1960s, but we worked with the
Judge to preserve minority political empowerment, one of the most
important civil rights issues of our time. We were aware that the po-
litical gains by minorities were achieved primarily through the strug-
gle of those who came before us. However, working so closely with
the Judge and observing first-hand the courage and commitment to
racial equality that he exhibited on a daily basis helped us to connect
emotionally with his philosophy: If you do not stand for something,
you will fall for anything. The Judge stood up for minority political
empowerment.
The Judge taught us, by his words and deeds, about the respon-
sibility that each of us has to provide a shoulder on which the next
generation can stand. The Judge, in turn, provided that shoulder for
us day in and day out. "Each one teach one" was a philosophy that
the Judge expected us to incorporate in our daily lives. The Judge
single-handedly trained an army of lawyers-many who are in
prominent positions throughout our government and the private sec-
tor--to stand up for justice, raise their voices, and help make Amer-
ica a better nation for generations to come. He never let us forget
that justice denied anywhere is justice denied everywhere. His dedi-
cation and commitment to racial equality through his words and
deeds will be forever embedded in the corridors of history.
The United States Supreme Court, in a series of five-to-four de-
cisions, 26 held that race could not be a dominant factor in drawing
district lines and invalidated the minority-majority districts at issue
in these cases. Lying at the heart of the challenge was a duality
26. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); and United States v. Hays, 515
U.S. 737 (1995) (holding that minority-majority districts that ignored tradi-
tional districting principles are racially gerrymandered and not narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling government interest).
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standard that the Judge had posited as one of the key driving forces
in understanding race in American jurisprudence.27 For example,
Justice Clarence Thomas in a concurrence in Bush v. Vera said that if
"a majority-minority district is created 'because of,' and not merely
'in spite of,' racial demographics ... [t]he resulting redistricting
must be viewed as a racial gerrymander., 28 The invocation of a col-
orblind jurisprudence harkening back to Justice Harlan's famous dis-
sent in Plessy v. Ferguson29 was yet another version of the duality
standard. Somehow a racial gerrymander is worse than a political
gerrymander, the resolution of which is to place African Americans
in a lesser position in the political arena and out of the negotiations
that are at the heart of the pull and haul of politics.
Democrats and Republicans, incumbents and functional incum-
bents, all have the option of negotiating and drawing district lines to
maximize their chances for reelection, but African Americans and
other minorities do not. In other words, the United States Supreme
Court will allow Republicans and Democrats to draw districting con-
figurations that will maximize their voting strength and allow in-
cumbents to draw misshapen lines to ensure their reelection rather
than allow a historically disadvantaged minority to have the opportu-
nity to elect a representative of their choice. It seems as if it has been
forgotten that the Voting Rights Act,3 and the "covered" jurisdic-
tions that are under its Section 5 supervision, have had long histories
of racial discrimination and are therefore subject to preclearance. 31
This was not the result of arbitrary governmental intervention
into the lives of a utopian colorblind society. These were remedial
actions taken in states that had a demonstrable pattern of racial bloc
voting that continues to exclude African Americans and other
27. See, e.g., SHADES, supra note 7; A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR. ET AL.,
The 0. Simpson Trial: Who Was Improperly "Playing the Race Card"?, in
BIRTH OF A NATION'HOOD: GAZE, SCRIPT, AND SPECTACLE IN THE O.J.
SIMPSON CASE (Toni Morrison & Claudia Brodsky Lacour eds., 1997).
28. Bush, 517 U.S. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring).
29. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
31. Under preclearance and the supervision of the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, the voter registration of African Americans in North Carolina increased
from 39.1% to 50.9% between 1960 and 1982. See SHADES, supra note 7, at
179.
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minorities. In a passage in Shades of Freedom that encapsulates this
notion, Judge Higginbotham quoted an eloquent dissent by Justice
White in Shaw. Justice White noted that even under North Caro-
lina's new redistricting plan, "whites remain a voting majority in a
disproportionate number of congressional districts. 32 He stated that
it was "both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection
principles" for the majority to void a redistricting plan whereby
North Carolina "sent itsfirst black representatives since Reconstruc-
tion to the United States Congress. 33
While we lost the battle, we did not lose the war because, in the
words of Frederick Douglas, "If there is no struggle there is no prog-
ress." 34 Despite this setback, the Judge maintained his powerful op-
timism and continued to forge ahead to advocate, in his teachings
and writings, for minority political empowerment.35
This experience fueled our passion for knowledge and change,
taught us about critical thinking, legal analysis, and most impor-
tantly, armed us with the power and enthusiasm to turn the Judge's
dream of racial equality and justice for all into reality. In the words
of Langston Hughes: "Hold fast to dreams, For if dreams die, Life is
a broken-winged bird, That cannot fly .... ,36 The Judge showed the
world how to soar.
B. Race and the American Legal Process
We had a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to work with the Judge
while he completed the second volume of his Race and the American
32. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 659 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. 2 PHILIP S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS:
PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE 1850-1860, at 437 (1950).
35. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of
Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1593 (1994); Cleo Fields & A. Leon Higginbothan, Jr., The Supreme Court's
Rejection of Pluralism, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, June 30, 1996, at 69; A.
Leon Higginbothan, Jr. & Aderson B. Francois, The Supreme Court's Blind-
ers, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, July 9, 1995, at 63; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
& Aderson B. Francois, The Supreme Court's Retrograde Ruling on Race,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 9, 1995, at E5.
36. Langston Hughes, Dreams, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON
HUGHES 32 (Arnold Rampersad ed., 1994).
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Legal Process series, Shades of Freedom.37 Shades of Freedom was,
simply put, Judge Higginbotham's masterpiece on race in the Ameri-
can legal process. In this volume, the Judge analyzed and explained
the negative impact race had had on African Americans from their
first appearance on the American continent in 1619 to the present.
He unabashedly critiqued those judicial decisions which contributed
to the oppression of African Americans throughout American his-
tory. The analysis wove together opinions on topics from voting to
housing to criminal rights.
The central framework of Shades of Freedom is the Ten Pre-
cepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence.35 After having read every
37. See SHADES, supra note 7. It followed his seminal publication and first
volume of The Race and the American Legal Process series, IN THE MATTER
OF COLOR, published in 1978, which won numerous national and international
awards, including the Silver Gavel Award of the American Bar Association.
See MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 12. It is often noted that the Judge's work
pioneered the recognition of the centrality of slavery law in American jurispru-
dence. A third volume of this series is forthcoming.
38. See SHADES, supra note 7, at 5-6 & Appendix. Judge Higginbotham
delineates the Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence that governed
the behavior of white slaveholders and lingers in our collective unconscious-
ness today with respect to race. The precepts are as follows:
1. Inferiority: Presume, preserve, protect, and defend the ideal of the
superiority of whites and the inferiority of blacks.
2. Property: Define the slave as the master's property, maximize the
master's economic interest disregard the humanity of the slave except
when it serves the master's interest and deny slaves the fruits of their
labor.
3. Powerlessness: Keep blacks-whether slave or free--as powerless
as possible so that they will be submissive and dependent in every re-
spect, not only to the master but to whites in general. Limit blacks'
accessibility to the courts and subject blacks to an inferior system of
justice with lesser rights and protections and greater punishments.
Utilize violence and the powers of government to assure the submis-
siveness of blacks.
4. Racial "Purity": Always preserve white male sexual dominance.
Draw an arbitrary racial line and preserve white racial purity as thus
defined. Tolerate sexual relations between white men and black
women; punish severely relations between white women and non-
white men. As to children who are products of interracial sexual rela-
tions, the freedom or enslavement of the black child is determined by
the status of the mother.
5. Manumission and Free Blacks: Limit and discourage manumis-
A LIFE WELL LIVED
published appellate case and statute related to race from 1630 to
1865, 39 Judge Higginbotham argued that, with respect to African
Americans, the analytic underpinnings of the American judicial sys-
tem are founded on a duality standard. This unspoken standard by
which we judge blacks differently from whites governs much of the
disparities in treatment that exist in the judicial system and else-
where. The Judge would often say that the "interstitial spaces" of the
law are where the "prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men''4° come into view.
Of these precepts, the Judge believed that the precept of inferi-
ority was the most illustrative, and Shades of Freedom focused on
this "first among equals" concept of the Ten Precepts. The examples
of the duality standard and its basis in the perceived inferiority of
blacks are numerous and range from criminal justice to equality in
housing to voting rights, as the Judge eloquently covered in the book.
sion; minimize the number of free blacks in the state. Confine free
blacks to a status as close to slavery as possible.
6. Family: Recognize no rights of the black family, destroy the unity
of the black ftanily, deny slaves the right of marriage; demean and de-
grade black women, black men, black parents, and black children; and
then condemn them for their conduct and state of mind.
7. Education and Culture: Deny blacks any education, deny them
knowledge of their culture, and make it a crime to teach those who are
slaves how to read or to write.
8. Religion: Recognize no rights of slaves to define and practice their
own religion, to choose their own religious leaders, or to worship with
other blacks. Encourage them to adopt the religion of the white mas-
ter, teach them that God who is white will reward the slave who obeys
the commands of his master here on earth. Use religion to justify the
slave's status on earth.
9. Liberty--Resistance: Limit blacks' opportunity to resist, bear arms,
rebel, or flee; curtail their freedom of movement, freedom of associa-
tion, and freedom of expression. Deny blacks the right to vote and to
participate in government
10. By Any Means Possible: Support all measures, including the use
of violence, that maximize the profitability of slavery and that legiti-
mize racism. Oppose, by the use of violence if necessary, all meas-
ures that advocate the abolition of slavery or the diminution of white
supremacy.
SHADES, supra note 7, at 195-96.
39. See id. at 3.
40. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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At the time of the publication of the book, the one notable area at the
forefront of the Judge's concerns was the current manifestations of
racial inferiority. The precept of inferiority appears to be so in-
grained in the collective conscious of America's past that to this day,
there are incidents that belie rational explanation. A man in Massa-
chusetts shot his pregnant wife and himself in their car and claimed
that a black man did it at a stop sign. The police then spent many
hours searching for a black man until his brother confessed that they
had fabricated the story and were the culprits. 41 Undoubtedly, there
are many other examples in addition to the six that are cited in
Shades of Freedom.42 The Judge raised these cases to point out the
continuing relevance of the Ten Precepts of American Slavery Juris-
prudence, particularly that the precept of inferiority-as in the belief
that if a white man or woman claims that a black man did it, he or
she will initially receive the presumption of truth-still persists in
America today.
Finally, on many occasions, the Judge sat with us and patiently
explained how a particular judge had made the wrong decision and
why and how the court could have reached a different conclusion.
The Judge consistently mentioned the choices judges have and com-
mented that each judge must decide which values are most impor-
tant. These were lessons in critical analysis we will never forget.
Shades of Freedom shall undoubtedly remain the definitive
work on the intersection of race and American jurisprudence for gen-
erations to come. The Judge's meticulously researched and docu-
mented work will set the standard for all scholars. While some indi-
viduals may take issue with the Judge's conclusions, no one would
doubt his conviction or brilliance. He will forever remain a giant as
a scholar on race and the American legal process, as well as one of
our leading jurists, counselors, and statesmen.43
41. See SHADES, supra note 7, at xxvii.
42. See id. at xxv-xxvii.
43. Paul Simon, former senator from Illinois, wrote on the back cover of
the hard copy version of Shades of Freedom the following: "There are two gi-
ants of the bench that did not make it to the Supreme Court: Learned Hand
and A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr."
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C. Substantive Equality and Affirmative Action
Finally, the Judge was deeply involved in the recent legal and
legislative challenges that threatened the very existence of affirma-
tive action programs and, along with it, the hope for substantive
equality for millions of minorities and women who continue to suffer
from discrimination and fundamental socioeconomic inequality.
In 1996, voters in California44 passed the popular initiative,
Proposition 209,45 which banned affirmative action in every aspect of
state government.46 That same year, the Fifth Circuit decided Hop-
wood v. Texas,47 which overturned the affirmative action component
44. Another state that later passed a similar initiative was Washington, but
the same measure was defeated in Houston, Texas. The wording of these
popular referenda was very important In California and Washington the term
used was "special preferences," while in Houston the words "affirmative ac-
tion" were used. See Tom Brune, Poll: 1-200 Passage Was Call for Reform,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at Al; Gregory Rodriguez, Too Many Places at
the Table: Civil Rights Movement Has Stooped to Victimization Contest,
Hous. CHRON., Mar. 21, 1999, at 1; Glenn Sheller, Affirmative Action Votes
Turn on Words, COLUMBUs DIsPATCH, Mar. 4, 1999, at 1 IA.
45. Proposition 209 was challenged in federal court, and a district court im-
posed an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, but the Ninth Circuit reversed
on appeal. See Coalition of Economic Equity, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997). The Ninth Circuit has also denied a re-
hearing en banc, and the litigants have indicated that they are prepared to ap-
peal the decision to the United States Supreme Court.
46. Adding to the tremendous setbacks in the legal and state initiatives are-
nas, a bill had been introduced in the United States Congress that would pro-
hibit affirmative action programs and policies in all federal programs. Repre-
sentative Charles Canady and Senator Mitch McConnell introduced House Bill
1909, ironically entitled the "Civil Rights Act of 1997." According to an
analysis by the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium
(NAPALC), the bill, as presently constituted, could block federal efforts to
provide remedies for proven discrimination and eliminate governmental efforts
to break the "glass ceiling" for women and minorities. NAPALC believes that
House Bill 1909 could block federal fair employment enforcement agencies
from considering statistical information when evaluating employment prac-
tices. The bill could even block targeted recruiting efforts designed to encour-
age minorities and women to apply for jobs and contracts in accordance with
their ability and would likely prohibit such activities as advertising to ethnic
press and recruitment efforts aimed at previously excluded groups.
47. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (hold-
ing that the University of Texas at Austin School of Law's affirmative action
admissions policy was unconstitutional and that diversity cannot be a compel-
ling state interest sufficient to justify the use of race in admissions decisions).
April 2000]
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:987
of the University of Texas at Austin School of Law's admissions
program. 4s The immediate and tragic result was that the most pres-
tigious public law schools in Texas and California 49 experienced an
immediate reduction in the number of minority students in their en-
tering classes.50 In addition, in the area of employment, the Third
Circuit5' in Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Pis-
cataway52 struck down an affirmative action program which permit-
ted the consideration of race in employment decisions for staffing the
school's faculty. The parties53 settled this case before the United
48. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Breaking Thurgood Marshall's Prom-
ise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 28 [hereinafter Marshall's
Promise].
49. The University of Texas at Austin, the University of California at Ber-
keley, and the University of California at Los Angeles law schools are among
the top five public law schools in the United States and the top twenty overall.
The incoming class at the University of Texas at Austin School of Law
dropped to 4 black and 26 Mexican American students out of an entering class
of 500 students from 31 black and 42 Mexican American students in the previ-
ous year's class. The University of California at Berkeley's minority admis-
sions dropped from 20 black and 28 Hispanic students to, at most, 1 black and
18 Hispanic students for its entering class totaling 270. The only black student
planning to attend the law school at Berkeley was admitted in 1997 and de-
ferred his enrollment UCLA Law School dropped from having 19 black and
45 Hispanic students to 10 black and 41 Hispanic students in its entering class
in the immediate aftermath of Proposition 209. See Peter Applebome, Minor-
ity Law School Enrollment Plunges in California and Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
28, 1997, atAl.
50. The New York Times reported that even Ward Connerly, an African
American who is one of the prime architects of the repeal of affirmative action
programs, remarked that these figures were shocking and that "[i]t's a bucket
of cold water in the face." Id.
51. The Third Circuit held that when two teachers are deemed to have equal
qualifications, racial considerations constitute a legitimate interest in making a
layoff decision. This decision struck a hard blow against the use of affirmative
remedies for existing racial inequities. As it came from the Third Circuit, the
Judge held particular misgivings.
52. 91 F.3d 1547, 1564 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117, and
cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
53. This case had quite an unusual case history. For example, the Justice
Department changed sides during the litigation. For a more complete picture
of the peculiar history of the case, see generally, Brett Pulley, A Reverse Dis-
crimination Suit Upends Two Teachers' Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1997, at
Al, and Linda Greenhouse, A Case on Race Puts Justice O'Connor in a Fa-
miliar Pivotal Role, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997, at Al. The case was finally
settled thanks to funds raised by a number of prominent civil rights organiza-
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States Supreme Court had a chance to hear it and left the future of af-
firmative action uncertain. 4
Many people in the civil rights and larger community turned to
the Judge for leadership and he generously involved us in the legal
and policy fronts of these often-contentious issues. We were in con-
sultation on the Hopwood case with the attorneys representing the
State of Texas and the University of Texas at Austin School of Law.
Our involvement would have extended to the highest court; however,
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on the grounds
that the issue was moot because the University of Texas at Austin
School of Law had changed the structure of its admissions program
prior to the appeal to the United States Supreme Court. On the leg-
islative front, the Judge testified before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on affirmative action. Finally, numerous entities and policy-
makers55 consulted the Judge, on many other levels, on how best to
proceed with rectifying the current inequities in the most basic areas
of life with the need to balance the interests of those potential non-
beneficiaries. 6
tions.
54. Affirmative action had come under increasing attack after Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down a federal af-
firmative action program by applying strict scrutiny to a minority set-aside
program in contracting, overruling the intermediate scrutiny standard for the
federal government reaffirmed less than five years earlier in Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)). The future of affirmative action
and the jurisprudence regarding it are at best unclear. There is only one race-
related case scheduled for the United States Supreme Court's 1999-2000 Term.
The case examines the constitutionality of a law permitting only those persons
of Hawaiian ancestry to vote for state officials who administer a land trust for
the sole benefit of those persons. See Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547 (D.
Haw. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 1248 (1999) (finding that the policy of
allowing only native Hawaiians to vote in the election for trustees of Office of
Hawaiian Affairs meets constitutional standards).
55. President Clinton launched a major initiative in a speech he delivered at
the University of California at San Diego. The President also created a panel
to study race relations, led by the distinguished historian John Hope Franklin.
See Alison Mitchell, Defending Affirmative Action, Clinton Urges Debate on
Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997, at Al; Opening a Conversation on Race,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1997, at A14.
56. The Clinton administration recently undertook an ambitious industry-
by-industry review of affirmative action in contracting with approximately
$200 billion in expenditures. The government is examining whether there are
discrepancies between the number of qualified businesses and the dollar value
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As with his other scholarship, the Judge was at the forefront of
critical analysis when it came to affirmative action. He noted a lack
of a comprehensive analysis of the issues surrounding affirmative
action. While much of the debate had been centered around political
positions, there was a significant lack of information regarding the
dramatic impact of affirmative action on those least privileged in so-
ciety-especially in the crucial areas of education and employ-
ment-and the historical evolution of the concept and diverse types
of programs that fall within the rubric of affirmative action. The
Judge sought to fill this void by introducing the type of concrete data
and balanced analysis that he hoped would make the debate an in-
formed and conscientious one.57 The Judge believed that a compre-
hensive review of affirmative action was the only way to move the
nation toward making the debate an insightful and thought-provoking
discourse.
He noted that the old models of affirmative action are based im-
plicitly on a notion of compensation. 58 Compensatory justice is pro-
posed to be designed to benefit those groups who have historically
suffered from bias. However, the price that the current generation
has to pay creates a class of "innocent victims." 59 The Judge strug-
gled with this notion, as do those of us who believe ardently in the
premise of affirmative action. We found the Taxman60 case to
be unique in that a court determined that an employer's affirm-
ative action plan to promote racial diversity violated the remedial
of government contracts awarded to those businesses. Evidence of significant
discrepancies may be viewed as discrimination. This approach is in response
to the Adarand decision and is tailored to meet the stringent requirements im-
posed by that decision. See John M. Broder, U.S. Readies Rules over Prefer-
ences Aiding Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1997, at Al.
57. The Judge did not dwell generally on hypotheticals. See generally
Hearing on the Issue of Affirmative Action, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of
A. Leon Higginbothan, Jr.).
58. See Erin E. Byrnes, Note, Unmasking White Privilege to Expose the
Fallacy of White Innocence: Using A Theory of Moral Correlativity to Make
the Case for Affirmative Action Programs in Education, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 535,
544-47 (1999).
59. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484-85 (1980) (setting forth
the "innocent parties" doctrine).
60. A distinguishing feature of the case parallels Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), in that the Court there was reluctant to ac-
cept the validity of affirmative action considerations in layoff decisions.
1002
antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII.6' As a general matter, it is
unusual to find that the only factor that will tip the balance is race or
gender. Therefore, the Judge believed that the jurisprudence of race
cannot be based on a hypothetical finding.62 Rather, an analysis of
affirmative action can and must consider the history of America.
African Americans must be afforded equal protection of the
laws. Because African Americans had been denied that protection
for countless generations, over hundreds of years, being treated as in-
ferior, it was necessary to ensure not only a formal provision, but
also a substantive grant of equal protection. Particularly given the
invidious nature of the evolving racism that has plagued this coun-
try,63 African Americans needed to be given the same substantive
opportunity to compete on a level playing field. The Judge argued
that affirmative action programs employ benign classifications--the
very means through which minorities have been discriminated
against-to combat residual discrimination. 64 Thus, benign classifi-
cations of race have, until recently, been given a less rigorous level
of scrutiny by the Court.65 The continued need for affirmative action
justified this level of scrutiny.
With the decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena66 ap-
plying strict scrutiny to even benign racial classifications, the Judge
felt that we would be well-admonished by the words of the late Jus-
tice Marshall. Justice Marshall protested that the United States
61. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1550.
62. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice
Powell described race as a "plus," implicitly noting that absolute equality is
likely to be a hypothetical rather than a reality. See id. at 317.
63. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL:
THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) (arguing racism is a permanent compo-
nent of American life); DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAW (1992) (discussing the role law has played in subordinating African
American rights); SHADES, supra note 7 (a history of race and the American
legal process).
64. The Judge conducted a comprehensive research project on affirmative
action that was generously supported by a team of philanthropic foundations
and to which he dedicated a great deal of his effort in his final years. The sup-
porting institutions included The Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Ford
Foundation, The MacArthur Foundation, The Mellon Foundation, The Mott
Foundation, and The Rockefeller Foundation.
65. See supra note 54.
66. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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Supreme Court's decision to subject all racial distinctions, whether
benign or invidious, to the same heightened level of scrutiny would
result in the dismantling of all affirmative action programs. In City
of Richmond v. Croson,67 he wrote this famous statement:
Because the consideration of race is relevant to remedying
the continuing effects of past racial discrimination, and be-
cause governmental programs employing racial classifica-
tions for remedial purposes can be crafted to avoid stigma-
tization, . . . such programs should not be subjected to
conventional "strict scrutiny"---scrutiny that is strict in the-
ory, but fatal in fact.68
Since the decision in Croson, the percentage of minority con-
tractors in Richmond, Virginia, decreased from thirty-five percent to
one percent.69 Moreover, with the decisions of Croson and Adarand
subjecting all levels of governmentally imposed affirmative action
plans to the same strict level of scrutiny, it remains to be seen
whether the trajectory of the lower courts, which have struck down
most affirmative action plans, will abate. We fear that the words of
Justice Marshall's admonition will become true.
The Judge spent the last years of his life striving in these and
many other ways to preserve the "life" of racial justice in America.70
As he stated in one of his articles shortly before his passing, "I
sometimes feel as if I am watching [racial] justice die.' 1
IV. REMEORANCE
Within this whirlwind of the Judge's activities, we must note-
and hope one day to emulate-Judge Higginbotham's gracious and
kind spirit. When the Judge was undergoing his third of successive
open heart surgeries, or while he was drafting a speech in the cab on
67. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
68. Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. at 519).
69. See Mary Frances Berry, Affirmative Action: Political Opportunities
Exploit Racial Fears, EMERGE, May 1995, at 23.
70. See Higginbotham, Marshall's Promise, supra note 48.
71. Id.; see also F. Michael Higginbotham & Linda Y. Yueh, Judge Hig-
ginbotham Will Be Sorely Missed, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1998, at A26 (quoting
this passage and discussing the Judge's hopes and worries for America at the
time of his passing).
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his way to deliver it-with an estimated time of arrival of five min-
utes-his first thought was always to inquire how you were doing.
72
He also had a wonderful sense of humor. When the Judge entered
the final phase of completing Shades of Freedom, he noted how most
authors give praise to their assistants and then take all the potential
blame and mistakes for themselves.73 The Judge, however, believed
that young people should learn early the lessons of personal respon-
sibility and that any mistakes were most certainly "collective., 74 In
the acknowledgments section of Shades of Freedom, it is clear that
we were not "let... off the hook."75
The Judge was overgenerous with credit and even more so with
his introductions. Whenever he would introduce each of us in public
at a function where many persons in attendance almost certainly had
curriculum vitaes exceeding ten pages, the Judge would introduce us
with such vigor that it became absolutely clear during the course of it
that our faces became flushed, our posture began to slope, and our
demeanor would belie the fact that the Judge may have just slightly
exaggerated our expertise. We were most certainly not the leading
experts on Title VII; the Russian, Japanese, and Slovakian lan-
guages; or the harpsichord, and we were not the reason that the Judge
was featured in a NBC special with Tom Brokaw.76 To the Judge,
however, ensuring that every person around him received fall-and
oftentimes too much-credit was something he did automatically and
72. No matter how busy the Judge was, he took time to inquire about how
we were doing. One of the authors will always remember when the Judge took
time from his hectic schedule to take her to the hospital for surgery and made
sure she was okay until her family arrived from out-of-town. It was moments
like this when the Judge let us know that he was more than "the Judge," but
that he was a great mentor and a friend who was truly concerned about our
well-being.
73. See SHADES, supra note 7, at xv.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. One author's younger sister was joyous when the Judge not only invited
her along to one of his appearances on MSNBC at Rockefeller Center, but told
her that she was the reason that he had been invited to be interviewed on air.
This same sister also enjoyed the Judge's hospitality on numerous occasions as
he usually took us out for delightful meals after a long day's work.
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without reservation.7 7 We can only hope that we may strive one day
to become the persons that he saw us to be.
Finally, a perhaps little-known fact about the Judge was that he
was a fantastic cook. He could barbecue chicken as well as anyone
in Texas--one of the authors who is from the Lone Star State can
attest to this fact. When we would go to the Judge's home, the
Judge's lovely and brilliant wife, Evelyn, would generously indulge
our disruptive presence week after week in their beautiful and warm
home.75 It was there that we knew that we would work for more
hours than may at first be considered humanly possible. Then we
would work some more.79 However, at the end of the day, and many
times in between, although we worked hard, we ate well. The Judge
would always make sure that we had enough cake80 to go with each
bite of ice cream and that each starving student had more than
enough to take back to the dorms. Some, we recall, took a bit more
than that. We did not go hungry at the office, either. The Judge
would always save room for dessert. His preference was for a deli-
cious cappuccino-chip cookie that used to be served in a caf6 in Har-
vard Square.
77. One of the authors was pleasantly surprised when the Judge, in the
middle of a speech he was delivering to a university audience, asked her eld-
erly mother-whom he had not met before-to stand up and be recognized.
Her mother beamed with pride as a man of the Judge's prominence acknowl-
edged her before an audience of over 200 people.
78. The Judge's generosity extended to his home. Each year, he and his
wife would invite one of their students to live with them in their spacious
house. One of the authors of this Article lived with the Higginbothams for al-
most a year. The Higginbothams not only welcomed her into their home, but
treated her as a member of the extended Higginbotham family.
79. Although our hours were often late and the work was stressful, the
Judge always had our well-being in mind. He consistently drove one of the
authors home each night after a long working session and dropped her off at
her door on the banks of the Charles.
80. One of the authors will never forget how he surprised her with a birth-
day cake in the middle of a working session at his house and how he unfail-
ingly phoned on her birthday each year and was even the first to call to con-
gratulate her on passing the Bar-from his car phone, of course, while en route
to the airport. The Judge traveled so much that he was given lifetime member-
ship in many elite frequent flyer and hotel programs!
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V. CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM
This was the Judge in "retirement." When those of us who
cared about him asked him to slow down from his untiring efforts to
combat injustice, he would quote a statement by one of his heroes,
Charles Hamilton Houston.81 This, we submit, is as reflective of the
Judge as any words can describe. Houston said, "I would rather die
on my feet, than live on my knees. 82
We miss him every day; we always will. The Judge's work has
undoubtedly allowed each of us to live tall. He loved America, de-
spite its past, gave everything to its present, and held great hopes for
its future. His was a life well lived in every sense, and we are a bet-
ter nation for it. Our debt to Judge Higginbotham is immense, and
we may only hope that each generation of Americans will remem-
ber. 3
81. It was always hard for us to believe that the Judge had heroes because
he was our ultimate idol.
82. Videotape: The Road to Brown: The Untold Story of "The Man Who
Killed Jim Crow" (California Newsreal 1989) (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law School Library).
83. The final aspect we want to mention was that the Judge made every
speech and every article into an opportunity to remind the later generations not
to forget the contributions of those who came before. In reviewing his 600
plus speeches, he made repeated references to Charles Hamilton Houston,
William Henry Hastie, Thurgood Marshall, Constance Baker Motley, Damon
Keith, and many other distinguished attorneys whose efforts on our behalf
made it possible for substantive equality to become reality rather than just a
hope for millions. One instance that captures an aspect of this legacy occurred
after the Judge had made one of his numerous appearances at NBC. Al Roker,
the popular meteorologist from the Today show, came running after the Judge
as we were leaving. He stopped the Judge to express his appreciation for what
he had done to make opportunities possible for so many. This, we submit, as
much as any tribute or accolade, is Judge Higginbotham's legacy.
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